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Abstract. 
The  World  Wide  Web  has  ushered  in  a  new 
generation  of  applications  constructively  linking  people  and 
computers  to  create  what  have  been  called  ‘social  machines.’ 
The  ‘components’  of  these  machines  are  people  and 
technologies.  It  has  long  been  recognised  that  for  people  to 
participate in social machines, they have to trust the processes. 
However,  the  notions of  trust often  used  tend to be  imported 
from agent-based computing, and may be too formal, objective 
and  selective  to  describe  human  trust  accurately.  This  paper 
applies a theory of human trust to social machines research, and 
sets out some of the challenges to system designers. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Computers have always been sociotechnical systems, embedded 
in organisations, or serving the purposes of users for work or 
leisure. However, thanks to the spread of interactive read/write 
technologies  (e.g.  wikis,  photo-sharing,  blogging)  and  devices 
and sensors embedded in both physical and digital worlds (e.g. 
GPS-enabled  hand-held  devices),  people  and  machines  have 
become  increasingly  integrated.  Terms  such  as  ‘augmented 
reality’  and  ‘mediated  reality’  are  in  common  use,  and  the 
embedding of computation into society via personal devices has 
led to discussion of social machines and social computation, an 
abstract conception in which people and machines interact for 
problem-solving.  The  ‘components’  of  the  machine  may  be 
people  or  computers;  the  ‘routines’  or  ‘procedures’  could  be 
carried out by humans, computers or both together. 
Social machines are rapidly becoming a focus of computing 
research [1]. ‘Programming the global computer’ is one of the 
British  Computing  Society’s  grand  challenges  for  computing, 
while peer-to-peer technologies have opened up the possibility 
of flexibly linking people and computers, as explored in projects 
such as OpenKnowledge (http://www.openk.org/) and the Social 
Computer community (http://www.socialcomputer.eu/). 
Trust has always been recognised as an important factor in the 
function of such human/computer hybrids. However, the notions 
of trust used have often been relatively formal, imported from 
agent-based research. In this paper, I will examine the question 
of  whether,  and  how,  social  computing  can  take  into  account 
wider and less well-ordered notions of psychologically realistic 
trust. I also note here two important limitations of scope of this 
paper. First, I focus here on issues of trust relevant to system 
designers  fostering  trust  in  their  systems  by  users;  of  course 
there are many other stakeholders and many other trust relations 
typically involved (to take an obvious example, system designers 
have to trust users as well as being trusted by them). Secondly, I 
focus here on the challenges; solutions are already being created 
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for these issues, but the point I want to emphasise in this paper is 
that we have to be clear about exactly how social machines rely 
on  trust  to  function,  and  where  a  breakdown  will  lead  to 
dysfunction.  Without  a  precise  model,  it  will  be  harder  to 
diagnose problems. 
2 SOCIAL MACHINES 
In this section, I will flesh out the idea of a social machine or 
social computer. After a preliminary discussion, I shall briefly 
describe a couple of examples. A third subsection will examine 
the notion of programming social machines, before the section is 
completed with a brief sketch of the important role trust plays. 
2.1 What is a social machine? 
The idea of a social machine was implicit in early conceptions of 
the World Wide Web. As Berners-Lee put it in 1999: 
Real life is and must be full of all kinds of social constraint – 
the  very  processes  from  which  society  arises.  Computers  can 
help if we use them to create abstract social machines on the 
Web: processes in which people do the creative work and the 
machine  does  the  administration.  ([2],  pp.172,  Berners-Lee’s 
emphasis) 
We  see  plenty  of  social  machines around  today.  Many  are 
embedded in social networks such as Facebook, in which human 
interactions from organising a birthday party to interacting with 
one’s Member of Parliament are underpinned by the engineered 
environment. Another type of example is a multiplayer online 
game,  where  a  persistent  online  environment  facilitates 
interactions concerning virtual resources between real people. A 
third type is an online poker game, where the resources being 
played for are real-world, but where the players may be human 
or  bots,  and  where  the  environment  in  which  the  game  takes 
place  is  engineered  around  a  relatively  simple  computational 
model.  In  such  systems,  (some  of)  the  social  constraints  that 
Berners-Lee talks about, which are currently norm-driven, are 
converted to (or in his terms administered by) the architecture of 
the programmed environment. 
These  social  machines  are  straightforward  (qua  interaction 
models),  but  as  the  technology  is  theorised  more  deeply  it  is 
inevitable  that  more  complex  systems  will  be  developed.  A 
generalised  definition  of  a  social  computation  is  provided  by 
Robertson and Giunchiglia: 
A  computation  for which  an  executable specification  exists 
but the successful implementation of this specification depends 
upon computer mediated social interaction between the human 
actors in its implementation. [3] 
In  such  an  environment,  self-organisation  (partial  or  full) 
becomes  viable  and  scalable,  while  physical  objects,  agents, 
contracts,  agreements,  incentives  and  other  objects  can  be 
referred to using Web resources (Uniform Resource Identifiers – URIs). ‘Programming’ the social computer (rather than simply 
supporting  and  directing  interactions  on  an  engineered 
environment)  and  integrating  larger  numbers  of  people  and 
machines will become increasingly feasible. 
2.2 Examples 
As a small example of a social machine, consider reCAPTCHA 
[4]. A CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to 
tell Computers and Humans Apart), invented by Louis Von Ahn, 
is the distorted sequence of letters that someone has to type in a 
box to identify him- or herself as a human (e.g. to buy a ticket 
online, or to comment on a blog). This is a task that computers 
cannot  do,  and  so  the  system  stops  bots  buying  thousands  of 
tickets for a concert or sporting event for later resale, or for a 
spambot to leave spam messages as comments to blogs. 
Von Ahn extended the idea of the CAPTCHA to create the 
reCAPTCHA,  which uses the same principle to solve  another 
problem. Google (which acquired reCAPTCHA in 2009) wishes 
to scan and publish out-of-copyright books. However, Optical 
Character Recognition is too fallible to automate the process (in 
books over 100 years old, OCR fails for about 30% of words). 
The quantity of books to be scanned rules out human labour as a 
general solution to the problem. 
Von  Ahn  noticed  that  his  original  CAPTCHA  device  was 
being used over 200m times a day, about half a million person-
hours of effort. reCAPTCHA was designed to put these person-
hours to more productive use. It presents the user who wishes to 
identify him- or herself as a human with two words, not one. The 
first is a normal CAPTCHA, and the second is a word from an 
old book that OCR had failed to identify. If the person succeeds 
with the first CAPTCHA, then he or she is known to be a human. 
As  humans  are  reliable  at  word  recognition,  Google  can 
therefore take the response to the second word as  a plausible 
suggestion of what it is. Presenting the same word to multiple 
users allows a consensus to emerge. 
The person is not necessarily aware that he or she is helping 
Google  in  its  scanning  task.  The  incentive  for  his  or  her 
involvement  is  the  need  for  identification  (to  buy  tickets,  or 
comment on a blog, etc). The time taken for a reCAPTCHA is 
not  significantly  longer  than  a  CAPTCHA.  The  ‘machine’ 
thereby  created,  of  millions  of  people  interacting  via  the 
reCAPTCHA facility, is currently identifying about 100m words 
per day (about 2m books equivalent per year). reCAPTCHA is 
offered  as  a  free  Web  service  to  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
websites (including Facebook, Twitter and Ticketmaster) which 
need spam protection; the service can be offered without a fee 
because of the translation service it also provides to Google [4]. 
As another example, Robertson and Giunchiglia [3] use the 
DARPA  balloon  challenge  of  2009,  in  which  all  human 
‘components’ of the machine are fully aware of their own role. 
In  the  DARPA  challenge,  the  aim  was  to  find  ten  weather 
balloons placed randomly around the US (in nine different states 
from California to Delaware). The rules of the challenge were 
intended to support the growth of a network of people taking part 
in the search, enabling a crowdsourced solution. The means of 
doing this in the winning solution (from Sandy Pentland at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) was to set out financial 
incentives – everyone  who discovered a balloon got a certain 
quantity of money, while for everyone who received a reward, 
the person who introduced them to the network received half that 
reward.  Hence  people  were  incentivised  both  to  look  for  the 
balloons and to add more people to the network. Pentland’s team 
began with 4 people, and using social media had recruited over 
5,000 at the point of completion, which took under ten hours. 
reCAPTCHA  and  the  DARPA  challenge  were  intended  to 
solve a particular exogenous problem, but social machines can 
be designed to solve the problems of the people who constitute 
them. In such cases, the incentive of the participants is that the 
machine’s  smooth  functioning  is  in  their  own  interests.  One 
could  imagine,  for  instance,  a  set  of  computer-mediated 
interactions enabling a community to provide a social response 
to problems of crime (such as BlueServo, which crowdsources 
the  policing  of  the  Texas-Mexico  border),  or  enabling  those 
suffering from a particular health care problem to pool resources 
and  to  offer  support  and  advice  to  fellow  sufferers  (such  as 
curetogether.com). It will be obvious from these examples that 
such efforts will not always be uncontroversial. 
Note finally that in many cases the ability to compute and to 
gather and process information at large scale is vital. This adds 
an extra layer of complication to the social machine vision. 
2.3 Programming the social machine 
Giunchiglia and Robertson define a social machine or computer 
as follows [3]: 
A  computer  system  that  allows  people  to  initiate  social 
computations  (via  executable  specifications)  and  adopt 
appropriate  roles  in  social  computations  initiated  by  others, 
ensuring  while  doing  so  that  social  properties  of  viable 
computations are preserved. A general purpose social computer 
provides a domain-independent infrastructure for this purpose.  
This implies three processes that need to take place in order 
for  the  social  machine  to  run.  First,  specifications  must  be 
initiated, so that where necessary groups of people are able and 
willing to carry out parts of the computation. It may be that part 
of  the  ‘programming’  of  the  social  machine  will  involve 
observation of and induction from existing social processes, to 
be adapted and reused in the new context of the social machine. 
Second, people and groups must adopt appropriate roles in 
the  machine,  having  been  incentivised  to  join  social 
computations. The discovery of these roles is an important issue. 
Third,  the  groups  relevant  to  the  computation  must  be 
reinforced; as Robertson and Giunchiglia put it, “this relies on 
the  computation  being  executed  in  a  way  that  spreads  the 
computation and knits together the social group via further social 
properties  of  the  computation.”  In  other  words,  the  social 
computation must preserve the social structures necessary for its 
operation. In the example of the DARPA challenge, the clause 
that rewards anyone who has introduced a reward-winner gives 
incentives to people to add friends to an ever-growing network. 
Robertson  and  Giunchiglia  also  define  a  social  property, 
analogous  to  an  invariant  in  conventional  programming  with 
real-world  physical  consequences:  “a  requirement  associated 
with  the  specification  of  social  computation  that  must  be 
maintained, and perhaps communicated, during the execution of 
the  specification  in  order  for  the  computation to  establish the 
social group needed to run it.” 
So if we return to the example of reCAPTCHA, its initiation 
involves  publicising  the  Web  service  to  sites  needing  spam 
protection, people adopt the appropriate role when they decide to 
solve  a  reCAPTCHA  to  get  access  to  a  service,  and  relevant groups  are  reinforced  by  the  success  of  the  service  in 
suppressing spam on sites to which people want access. The key 
social  property  to  be  preserved  is  that  spam  is  suppressed;  if 
spammers found an effective way around the reCAPTCHA, then 
fewer sites would support the Web service, and therefore fewer 
people would be playing the role of word recognisers. 
2.4 The relevance of trust 
Trust is essential to the smooth running of a social machine. Two 
precondition  for  social  machines  to  motivate  people  to  adopt 
appropriate roles is that they trust that promised incentives will 
appear, and that they trust that the machine will not do anything 
(in  the  world)  that  conflicts  with  their  values.  In  the  case  of 
reCAPTCHA, people must trust that they will obtain access to 
their  desired  sites.  In  the  case  of  the  DARPA  challenge,  the 
participants must have trusted that the money would be paid out. 
Trust  is  also  central  to  the  reinforcement  of  groups,  as 
cooperation  towards  a  goal  demands  trust  in  others’ 
contributions; would Wikipedia authors bother to contribute if 
their work was routinely trashed without argued rationales? If an 
effect of a computation was to fragment the coalitions developed 
to carry it out by undermining trust between members, then it 
could not ultimately succeed. It is fair to say that for many social 
computations, trust (both between individuals in different roles, 
and of the machine by its component individuals) is likely to be 
a social property essential to the social machine’s function. 
Trust is of course most important when people take risks or 
place themselves in a vulnerable position with respect to a social 
machine.  With  reCAPTCHA  this  is  barely  an  issue,  but  in  a 
machine that, for example, enabled people to manage health care 
problems,  users  might  need  to  pool  information  which  could 
include sensitive health- or lifestyle-related data. That brings in 
complex  rights-based  issues  such  as  privacy,  and  legal  issues 
such as data protection. 
In the next section, I shall briefly set out some of the most 
important properties of trust, as background to a discussion of 
issues that arise with respect to trust in social machines. 
3. TRUST 
The discussion of trust will be in four parts, beginning with an 
analysis of trustworthiness, upon which will be built an analysis 
of trust. Finally I shall discuss issues surrounding the connection 
of  the  two.  These  analyses are  developed  in  more  detail  in a 
working paper [5]. 
3.1 Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness is prior to trust, which is an attitude toward the 
trustworthiness of others. Indeed, as Hardin has argued ([6], [7]), 
many  commentators  supposedly  discussing  trust  are  actually 
discussing trustworthiness. What, then, is this prior concept? 
A trustworthy person is someone who does what she says she 
will  do,  all  things  being  equal.  This  characterisation  conceals 
quite a lot of structure. First of all, trustworthiness is a property 
of  an  agent.  A  claim  must  be made  about  her  future  actions. 
After  all,  it  is  absurd  to  accuse  Barack  Obama  of  being  an 
untrustworthy brain surgeon, because he has never claimed to 
have brain surgery skills. The claim will also narrow the scope 
of trustworthiness; put another way, trustworthiness is context-
dependent.  The  ‘all  things  being  equal’  clause  means  that  a 
trustworthy person need not succeed in carrying out the claimed 
behaviour, but if she does not, there must be an explanation for 
her failure which will absolve her of responsibility. 
We  can  therefore  define  trustworthiness  as  a  four-place 
relation, as follows: 
  (1) Y is trustworthy =df Tw<Y,Z,R,C> 
  where Y and Z are agents, R is a representation of the 
claim and C is a (task) context in which it applies. 
In (1), Y is the agent who, if (1) is true, is trustworthy. R is 
the content of the claim made about her intentions, capacities 
and  motivations  for  future  behaviour.  When  (1)  is  true,  Y’s 
behaviour will be constrained by R. R may be explicitly written 
down, or may be implicit and understood; it may be open-ended 
and deliberately left unspecific to degrade gracefully. C is the set 
of contexts in which R is intended to apply (for instance, Y may 
claim to be a trustworthy car mechanic, but only within office 
hours, and only on certain makes of car). 
This leaves Z, who is the agent responsible for generating and 
disseminating  the  claim  R.  In  many,  perhaps  most, 
circumstances,  Y = Z.  However,  this  need  not  be  the  case.  A 
trustworthy  customer  service  employee  (Y)  respects  a  role 
description generated by her company (Z). A trustworthy piece 
of software (Y) performs according to a specification written by 
a designer (Z). It is essential that Z is authorised to make the 
claim about Y. Without authority, Z’s claim has no bearing on 
Y’s trustworthiness. 
3.2 Trust 
Trust  is  an  attitude  toward  the  trustworthiness  of  another.  X 
trusts Y iff he believes that she is trustworthy (or, better, holds of 
the proposition ‘Y is trustworthy’ that it is true). 
This  characterisation  of  trust  has  a  straightforward  surface 
appearance. It is still a complex idea, however. Not only does 
trustworthiness import context-dependency, but trust forces us to 
confront  a  subjective  element.  There  are  six  parameters  of 
consequence in the trust relation, as follows: 
  (2) X trusts Y =df Tr<X,Y,Z,I(R,c),Deg,Warr> 
  with Y, Z and R as before, and X an agent. 
In (2), the first three parameters are the relevant agents. X is 
the  trustor  and  Y  the  trustee.  Z,  as  before,  is  the  agent  who 
makes  the  claim  R  about  Y’s  intentions,  capacities  and 
motivations. And again, as before, it could be that Z = Y (or, for 
that matter, X = Y, X = Z or X = Y = Z, although the possibility 
of these identities will not be defended here [5]). 
Z makes a claim that Y’s behaviour, all things being equal, 
will conform to R in contexts C. X’s trust, if well-placed, should 
accept  that  claim.  However,  it  need  not,  because  X  is  only 
boundedly rational and communications between Z and X  are 
not guaranteed to succeed. Furthermore, R might be implicit or 
unspecific. Hence X has to interpret R’s meaning in the contexts 
in which he is interested. I have written this as a function I(R,c), 
to be read as X’s interpretation of the force of R in the set of 
contexts that interest X, which I term c. 
This brings trust’s subjective aspect to the fore. For X’s trust, 
it is X’s interpretation that is the final arbiter, whether or not it is 
accurate. As trust is an attitude held by X about Y, it is X who 
supplies the underlying assumptions of the judgment. This has 
three specific consequences. First, for Y to maintain X’s trust, she must behave in accordance with I(R,c) even if that differs 
from her own interpretation of R in c. Second, for X to trust Y, it 
need not be the case that Z has authority to make claim R about 
Y. It is necessary only that X believes that Z has that authority. 
Third,  I(R,c)  only  has  any  force  with  respect  to  Y  if  c ⊆ C, 
otherwise it will fall out of the scope of R. Yet for X’s trust, it is 
necessary only that X believes that c ⊆ C. If any of X’s beliefs is 
false – i.e. if the force of R in c is not I(R,c), or if Z does not 
have the authority to make claim R about Y, or if c ⊈ C – X’s 
trust  or  mistrust  will  be  misplaced  as  based  on  a 
misunderstanding. 
In  short,  in  definition  (2)  above,  X  believes  that  (i) Z  can 
authoritatively  make  claim  R  about  Y,  (ii) I(R,c)  is  the 
interpretation of R within a set of contexts c, and (iii) c ⊆ C. 
This leaves two more parameters. Deg is a measure of X’s 
confidence in his attitude toward Y’s trustworthiness. The metric 
for  Deg  depends  on  the  system  under  discussion.  For 
psychological  realism,  it  may  be  that  Deg  would  be  a  fairly 
coarse-grained Likert-type psychometric scale of five or seven 
points.  But  it  would  be  legitimate  to  produce  more  complex 
models that modelled Deg on, say, the real line between 0 and 1. 
Whatever metric chosen must facilitate the expression of two 
types  of  trust  judgment.  First  of  all,  X  may  have  to  choose 
whether he trusts Y1 more than Y2 to decide with whom to place 
his trust. Secondly, the level of risk that X takes on with respect 
to an interaction with Y will depend on his degree of trust; if he 
trusts her a lot, he will, all things being equal, be prepared to risk 
a lot, and if he trusts her only a little, his appetite for risk will be 
diminished. 
Warr is the warrant for X’s trust in Y. This could take any 
form – it doesn’t have to be rational, and could even be that X 
has been dosed with oxytocin which increases the propensity to 
trust [8]. Unlike a warrant in Toulmin’s system [9], the warrant 
explains the judgment, but is not intended for the persuasion of 
others. Nevertheless, usually there is a sensible rationale behind 
a trust judgment which is important for assessing it, and also for 
assessing how robust it is likely to be. Typical relatively reliable 
trust warrants include the reputation of Y, the past history of X’s 
encounters  with  Y,  the  availability  of  sanctions  for  X,  the 
possibility of a binding reciprocal agreement between X and Y, 
the credible commitments made by Y and the credentials that Y 
brings to the transaction. 
As  Wierzbicki  argues  ([10],  pp.26-27),  trust  that  does  not 
have a rational component will be hard to model. That does not 
mean that trust cannot be irrational, but it makes it harder to 
embed  psychologically-realistic  trusting  mechanisms  into 
software,  or  to  design  sociotechnical  systems  (or  social 
machines) which incorporate potentially irrational human trust 
judgments without restriction. 
3.3 The problem of trust 
The problem of trust is not to increase trust, but rather to ensure 
that X trusts Y when and only when Y is trustworthy. This is 
difficult as the incentives are not optimally aligned. If X risks 
assets  in  an  interaction  with  Y,  then  he  benefits  from  her 
trustworthiness,  but  unfortunately  he  only  controls  his  trust. 
Conversely,  Y  benefits  from  X’s  trust,  but  only  controls  her 
trustworthiness. The result is a dilemma where the benefits of 
cooperation could be high, but losses to a trusting (trustworthy) 
party would accrue if their partner is untrustworthy (distrusting). 
From this two things follow. First, trust cannot be an entirely 
rational attitude; as Hollis has argued, trustworthiness does not 
survive  rigorous  game-theoretic  analysis  (a  fact  available  to 
rational  would-be  trustors)  [11].  Second,  X  should  use  the 
analysis  of  (2)  to  determine  where  trust  judgments  can  break 
down.  Many  failures  of  trust  are  down  to  differences  in 
interpreting what Y is committed to. 
A typical strategy for a trustworthy Y is to send signals of 
trustworthiness to X, which ideally will accurately represent her 
trustworthiness  (would  not  be  forthcoming  if  she  were  not 
trustworthy) and which will be included in X’s warrant to trust Y 
[12]. These signals can be conscious or unconscious, and more 
or  less strongly  connected  with  the  task  that  Y is  offering  to 
carry out, preferably as an unavoidable by-product. The flip side 
of  any  such  signalling  system,  however,  is  that  if  it  is  made 
explicit, it can potentially be counterfeited by an untrustworthy 
person.  Types  of  signal  already  mentioned  include  Y’s 
reputation, history and credible commitments. 
A  second  strategy  involves  structuring  the  encounter  with 
some kind of institution (in the broad sense of a mechanism for 
producing order by structuring behaviour) which can reduce the 
likelihood  of  a  deception  being  in  Y’s  interest.  Such  an 
institution  might  supply  objective  credentials  for  Y,  or  might 
make plausible and effective sanctions available for X to apply if 
Y defects. Or X and Y might set up their own ‘mini-institution’ 
by  entering  into  a  reciprocal  agreement.  In  each  case,  an 
institution promotes X’s trust in Y only if X trusts the institution 
to deliver the structures it promises. 
4 TRUST IN SOCIAL MACHINES: CURRENT 
APPROACHES 
As noted earlier, trust is a vital element for social machines to 
function. However, this is a complex issue: in the open peer-to-
peer  architectures  that  will  be  required  to  support  social 
machines, traditional knowledge engineering safeguards (such as 
centralisation  of  key  functions,  shared  culture  and  ontologies, 
constraints  and  access  control)  are  not  practicable.  In  this 
section, I will expand on the theme of trust, using the theoretical 
apparatus assembled in Section 3. 
Importing  human  interaction  into  the  programming 
environment envisaged by Robertson and Giunchiglia presents a 
major  challenge.  Hendler  and  Berners-Lee  see  artificial 
intelligence  as  the  key  to  enable  people  and  machines  to 
represent  and  reason  over  social  attitudes  including  trust  and 
trustworthiness, as well as related issues such as reliance  and 
expectations;  linked  data  and  the  Semantic  Web  will  be 
important  tools  in  such  a  world,  by  providing  designers  with 
access  to  a  level  of  abstraction  in  which  resources  can  be 
referred to directly and independently of the documents in which 
they  are  described  [13].  Machines  which  require  users  to 
contribute  information  (such  as  those  mentioned  earlier  to 
coordinate community responses to crime or healthcare issues) 
will also need to reason about privacy and data protection. 
The  human  world  is  messy  and  full  of  compromise; 
computations in social machines must be able to cope with the 
consequences of this, such as inconsistency. Furthermore, given 
the sensitivity of personal data, social machines will also need to 
be able to function in hostile environments where some actors 
are malicious. Although  this  is  a  lively  area  for  research,  there  are  few 
robust  and  scalable  structures  in  place  to  represent  these 
qualities. Hendler and Berners-Lee point out the importance of 
being able to treat these social phenomena as first-class objects 
capable of being reasoned over. The Semantic Web provides a 
blueprint for this, allowing the use of URIs to name objects of 
any kind [13]. 
In  open  environments,  trust  needs  to  be  fostered  from  a 
number of sources. The most common view is to describe the 
relations between peers in a peer-to-peer architecture in terms of 
permissions and obligations governed by policies [14]. Theorem 
provers can determine whether peers have conformed to policies 
[15] and systems have been developed to explore the question of 
how to specify and verify strategies to determine whether and 
when to interact, and with whom [16]. 
5 DISCUSSION: THE HUMAN ELEMENT 
One issue is that these approaches tend to assume that human 
trust behaviour is relatively well-behaved and if not rational at 
least  fairly tidy and explicable.  Yet as argued in section 3, it 
need not necessarily be so; as Kahneman has recently pointed 
out,  rational  processing  coexists  with  fast,  intuitive  and 
emotional thinking [17]. Furthermore, the subjective element of 
trust  is  deep-seated.  Hence  policies  may  work  very  well  to 
describe interactions in distributed systems unless elements are 
likely  to  behave  idiosyncratically.  Reasoning  is  only  one 
approach to making a trust judgment, and may well involve a 
complexity  that  is  inappropriate.  Human  judgments  about 
trustworthiness  of  complex  and  distributed  systems  will  not 
always align with the methods, ontologies and terms in which 
questions are framed by system designers. The key factors for 
consideration, as argued in section 3.2, include X’s view of Z, 
X’s interpretation of R, and the warrants that X accepts. 
5.1 Displacing trust 
Most  approaches  to  trust  in  multi-agent  systems  assume  that 
information relevant to agents’ reputation, or data provenance, or 
data  security  will  suffice  to  align  trust  and  trustworthiness. 
Certainly  transparency  and  availability  of  information  about 
these is a bonus, and can do no harm. But will they be sufficient? 
Trust is not always grounded; X’s trust of Y may depend on 
his trust of Z. In many scenarios, X is given information by the 
system about the reputation of Y, or about the provenance of 
some information – it is widely accepted that these are important 
for trust. But even assuming that a typical X is willing to restrict 
his  warrant  for  his  trust  in  Y  to  reputation,  provenance, 
recommendations  and  other  mechanisms  that  have  been 
extensively theorised online, he still needs to trust the source of 
the reputation/provenance/recommendation. If someone does not 
trust, say, Amazon, they are unlikely to trust the *-rating system 
that it hosts, even though it is intended to provide an objective 
assessment  of  Amazon’s  products.  The  provision  of  such 
information does not solve the trust problem – it just displaces it 
to another point of the system. 
Recall  also  a  point  made  earlier,  that  institutions  can  help 
promote well-placed trust if they are themselves trusted. It is also 
worth noting in this context that people contributing to a social 
machine, by trusting the machine’s structuration of behaviour, 
also  have  to  trust  that  their  fellow  users  will  behave  in  good 
faith. The trustworthiness of the machine will also depend on the 
trustworthiness of the user community. This is somewhat beyond 
the  scope  of  this  paper,  which  focuses  on  the  challenges  to 
designers,  but  the  wide  range  of  other  stakeholders  (owners, 
managers,  shareholders,  policymakers,  users)  should  be  an 
important  focus  of  future  research,  and  a  complete  social 
machine program should take all relevant roles into account. 
5.2 The logic of trust 
Z makes a claim about how Y will perform. Y in this case is the 
social machine, and Z the administrator. X’s trust of the social 
machine  will  depend  on  his  trust  of  the  administrator.  For 
instance, the motivation of the people from whom information is 
crowdsourced  in  the  DARPA  network  challenge  depended  on 
financial  incentives  (a) to  provide  information  to  the 
administrator, and (b) to introduce new people to the group. The 
function  of  that  social  machine  depended  among  many  other 
things  on  enough  people  trusting  the  administration  of  the 
machine, and the likelihood of its dispersing the money. 
Indeed, because we are dealing with trust with its subjective 
element, all that was required was that the various Xs believed 
that remuneration would be forthcoming. The money need not 
actually have been in place at all. Hence if we are formalising 
social  machines  using  a  process  calculus  (as  advocated 
persuasively by Robertson and Giunchiglia), we need to make a 
distinction between those social properties which need to be true 
in  order  for  a  social  machine  to  achieve  its  purpose,  those 
properties which need to be believed to be true (but which need 
not be true), and those properties which need to be both true and 
believed. 
This  matters  because  a  calculus  should  describe  necessary 
conditions for a machine’s function. In the case of the DARPA 
challenge, the existence of a pot of money to be distributed to the 
participants  was  neither  sufficient  nor necessary  to  the  social 
machine’s function. It was not sufficient, because if would-be 
participants were unaware of or did not believe in the financial 
remuneration  they  would  not  have  taken  part.  It  was  not 
necessary,  because  all  that  mattered  was  that  the  participants 
were motivated, not that they were paid. Of course, this problem 
is most dramatic in a one-shot system, but will always re-emerge 
in some form even in contexts with repeat runs. 
Indeed, spreading the truth about how a machine will function 
could on occasion undermine that very functioning. The reader 
may  have  noticed  that  someone  helping  Google  by  using  a 
reCAPTCHA  need  not  be  aware  that  he  or  she  is  doing  that 
(although  Google  makes  no  secret  of  it).  This  introduces  an 
exploitative  element  to  reCAPTCHA;  one  wishes  to  identify 
oneself as a human, but having done that, one is also required to 
perform an extra task, which is not identified as such, to help 
Google scan an old book. 
reCAPTCHA demands very little effort, so the exploitation is 
probably bearable, but even so someone might resent having to 
help Google when they wanted to interact with Facebook. More 
generally,  if  people  came  to  understand  that,  say,  a  social 
network  was  gathering  information  about  them  primarily  in 
order to sell to marketing companies, or that a healthcare social 
machine  was  gleaning  information  primarily  to  sell  to 
pharmaceutical companies, the feeling of exploitation (even if it 
was plausibly in the interests of the users) might have the effect of discouraging the users from taking part. It is essential to make 
a  distinction  between  what  is  known  about  the  system,  what 
users should believe (even if false) about the system, and what 
users should be unaware of (even if true) about the system. 
5.3 Differences of interpretation 
Where the interests of Z and X do not align, it is important to 
ensure that X’s interpretation of R coincides with that of Z. This 
is not always the case with technology. Where Z is a designer 
who  has  created  an  artificial  agent  Y,  Y’s  trustworthiness  is 
often measured by Z against a highly technical specification R. 
However,  the  user  X  will  typically  see  the  technology 
holistically as part of a system with which he is confronted. If we 
take  the  example of  an  ID  card,  the  system  designer  may  be 
pleased to have devised a secure system. But the owner of the 
card will judge it in terms of the extent to which it empowers and 
constrains him. As Charles Raab puts it, “it is no comfort to a 
privacy-aware  individual  to  be  told  that  inaccurate,  outdated, 
excessive and irrelevant data about her are encrypted and stored 
behind hacker-proof firewalls until put to use by (say) a credit-
granting organization in making decisions about her” [18]. 
There are many types of case where R, the claim that is made 
about Y, can be very different from I(R,c), X’s interpretation of 
that claim. If trust is to be maintained, R must be couched in a 
way that is meaningful for X. A merely technical specification of 
behaviour,  however  accurate,  is  unlikely  to  be  enough.  Yet  a 
technical specification of the system’s behaviour is required if 
we are to be able to program social machines rigorously. 
6 CONCLUSION 
The problem of trust is that it is hard to align to an arbitrary 
degree  of  certainty  with  trustworthiness.  It  is  important,  if 
dispiriting, to note that the most trustworthy system is useless if 
it  is  not  trusted.  Furthermore,  it  could  happen  that  a  trusted 
system  works  perfectly  well  (to  its  designers’  satisfaction, 
anyway) even if it is not trustworthy. 
Much will depend on the incentives given to participants. In 
the case of machines which provide a good user experience (for 
example, healthcare networking sites from which people get best 
practice  or  companionship  or  counselling  from  others  with 
similar problems), specifying that experience  will be difficult. 
All a designer can really specify are issues such as the privacy 
and  security  with  which  health  data  are  stored.  These  are 
important factors for user trust, but the porousness of the system 
will also depend on the propensity of the networking humans to 
misuse  or  leak  information  they  gain,  for  example  from 
chatrooms.  The  nature  of  the  user  community  is  at  least  as 
important as the technical specification. 
Taking this thought to a logical conclusion, it is likely that 
public trust in such machines will be highest when the public has 
had  a  say  in  their  design  and  operation.  The  closer  the 
relationship  between  trustor,  designers  and  administrators,  the 
better. This suggests that a focus of future research here might be 
the development of tools and protocols to allow communities to 
design social machines to their own specifications. 
In machines such as reCAPTCHA and the DARPA challenge, 
where the humans in the loop are performing tasks subordinate 
to  the  wider  goal  of  the  system  and  gaining  nothing  intrinsic 
from participation, the classic trade-off of trust (that trust matters 
and trustworthiness is secondary, especially in one-shot games), 
is  harder  to  avoid.  ‘Programming’  of  such  machines  using 
process calculi should, from the point of view of good design, 
make the necessary and sufficient conditions clear. Whether this 
promotes  or  restricts  cynicism  is  an  empirical  question  upon 
whose answer the future of social machines will probably rest. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The work reported in this paper was funded by the EnAKTing 
project,  EPSRC  Grant  EP/G008493/1.  Thanks  to  Dave 
Robertson, Luc Moreau and three referees for comments. 
REFERENCES 
[1]  A. Bernstein, M. Klein and T.W. Malone, Programming the 
Global Brain, Communications of the ACM, in press. 
[2]  T. Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web: the Original Design and 
Ultimate  Destiny  of  the  World  Wide  Web,  Harper  Collins, 
New York (1999). 
[3]  D.  Robertson  and  F.  Giunchiglia,  Programming  the  Social 
Computer, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 
in press. 
[4]  L. Von Ahn, B. Maurer, C. McMillen, D. Abraham and M. 
Blum,  reCAPTCHA:  Human-Based  Character  Recognition 
via  Web  Security  Measures,  Science,  321:1465-1468  (12
th 
Sept, 2008). 
[5]  K.  O’Hara,  A  General  Definition  of  Trust,  working paper, 
http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/23193/, (2012). 
[6]  R. Hardin, Trustworthiness, Ethics 107:26-42, (1996). 
[7]  R. Hardin, Trust, Polity Press, Cambridge, (2006). 
[8]  M. Kosfeld, M. Heinrichs, P.J. Zak, U. Fischbacher and E. 
Fehr, Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans, Nature, 435:673-
676 (2
nd June, 2005). 
[9]  S.  Toulmin,  The  Uses  of  Argument,  Cambridge  University 
Press, Cambridge, 1958. 
[10]  A.  Wierzbicki,  Trust  and  Fairness  in  Open,  Distributed 
Systems, Springer, Berlin, (2010). 
[11]  M. Hollis, Trust Within Reason, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, (1998). 
[12]  A. Pentland, Honest Signals: How They Shape Our World, 
MIT Press, Cambridge MA, (2008). 
[13]  J. Hendler and T. Berners-Lee, From the Semantic Web to 
Social Machines: a Research Challenge for AI on the World 
Wide Web, Artificial Intelligence 174 156-161 (2010). 
[14]  M.  Sloman,  Policy  Driven  Management  for  Distributed 
Systems,  Journal  of  Network  and  Systems  Management, 
2:333-360, (1994). 
[15]  M. Alberti, D. Daolio, P. Torrini, M. Gavanelli, E. Lamma 
and  P.  Mello,  Specification  and  Verification  of  Agent 
Interaction Protocols in a Logic-Based System, Proceedings 
of the 2004 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing (SAC 
’04), ACM Press, New York (2004), 72-78. 
[16]  N. Osman and D. Robertson, Dynamic Verification of Trust 
in  Distributed  Open  Systems,  Proceedings  of  the  20
th 
International  Joint  Conference  on  Artificial  Intelligence 
(IJCAI),  Hyderabad,  India  (2007), 
http://www.ijcai.org/papers07/Papers/IJCAI07-232.pdf. 
[17]  D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Allen Lane, London, 
2011. 
[18]  C.D. Raab, The Future of Privacy Protection, in R. Mansell 
and  B.S.  Collins  (eds.),  Trust  and  Crime  in  Information 
Societies,  Edward  Elgar  Publishing,  Cheltenham,  (2005), 
282-318. 